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Abstract
In this paper, I assess the strategies and outcomes of the first dozen years of the transition
from plan to market, and outline of the principal challenges faced by these economies. My overall
assessment is that the performance during the first twelve years of the transition has been poor.
While important structural transformations have taken place, the relative gap in per capita income
between these countries and the advanced economies has widened. A major problem was clearly
the initial recession that set these countries back relative to the advanced economies. Transition
countries further east have on average performed worse than their more western counterparts.
However, geography does not provide a complete explanation -- policies do matter. All transition
countries carried out quickly what I term Type I reforms -- macroeconomic stabilization, price
liberalization, reduction of direct subsidies, breakup of trusts, state-owned enterprises and the
monobank system, removal of barriers to the creation of new firms, carrying out small-scale
privatization, and introduction of a social safety net -- which all transition economies carried out
quickly. However, they differed in Type II reforms: large-scale privatization, further (in-depth)
development of a commercial banking sector and effective tax system, labor market regulations
and institutions related to the social safety net, and establishment and enforcement of a market-
oriented legal system and accompanying institutions. The reform of greatest importance seems to
be that countries that placed emphasis on the development of a functioning legal framework and
corporate governance of firms have performed better than those that did not. Evidence also
suggests that large-scale privatization can be handled in a variety of ways, or even delayed, as
long as the state-owned firms face the discipline of needing to earn their way without government
bailouts and as long as new firms appear through new creation, breakups of old firms, and foreign
investment.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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The collapse of the Soviet political and economic system in the late 1980s,
epitomized by the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, culminated a dramatic
economic slowdown experienced by the Soviet bloc countries over the preceding three
decades. The resulting transition from central planning to a market economy has been
difficult.  The performance of the transition economies has fallen short of expectations
for several reasons: advanced western economies did unusually well in the 1990s, which
raised the bar for perceptions of economic success; the economic problems associated
with the transition were widely underestimated; and policymakers made a number of
questionable choices. Nevertheless, progress has been made in a number of dimensions.
In this paper, I provide an overall assessment of the strategies and outcomes of the
first dozen years of the transition, as well as an outline of the principal challenges faced
by these economies. In presenting data and examples, I focus primarily on comparing the
experience of the five central European countries -- Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia, and Slovenia – with the experience of Russia. The five central European
countries have a combined population of over 65 million people and were the first to
launch the transition. Russia, with its population of 145 million, is the principal country
of the former Soviet Union and now of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
which is made up of countries that were formerly republics of the Soviet Union, but it has
had a very difficult experience with transition. I will also make a number of references to
three other groups: the three Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, with a
combined population of 7.5 million, that became part of the Soviet Union only at the
outset of World War II and in the 1990s staged a relatively fast transition; the Balkan or
southeast European countries of Albania, Bulgaria and Romania, combined population 34William Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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million, that have not been affected by war or other conflicts; and Ukraine as the second
largest economy of the former Soviet Union and now CIS, with its population of 50
million. I will not discuss except in passing the many smaller countries of the CIS:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. I also will not focus on the countries of the former
Yugoslavia, since their formative experiences of the 1990s involve war and civil strife
rather than economic transition.
The Soviet-style centrally planned system was relatively well suited to mobilizing
resources for expanding existing productive activities during World War II and the post-
war reconstruction, although it also suppressed human rights and imposed great human
suffering. The Soviet bloc countries achieved a 4.5 percent annual growth rate in per
capita GNP during the 1950s, exceeding the 3.7 percent rate of growth of a comparison
group of market economies (Gregory and Stuart, 1997).
1 However, the rigidities of the
command economy made it much less suitable for invention, innovation and efficient
allocation of resources, resulting in a long-term slowdown in the entire Soviet bloc since
about 1960. While the comparison group of market economies averaged rates of growth
of GNP per capita of 4.5 percent in the 1960s, 2.8 percent in the 1970s and 2 percent in
the 1980s, the growth of per capita GNP of the Soviet bloc countries is estimated to have
fallen to 3.6 percent in the 1960s, 2.8 percent in the 1970s, and 0.8 percent in the 1980s.
The fall of communism created expectations that the centrally planned economies
would generate rapid economic growth and gradually catch up with middle income
                                                     
1 In Gregory and Stuart (1997),  the Soviet bloc includes all the states of the Soviet Union plus Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. The market economies in the sample
include Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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developed countries as they moved to a market system. These expectations were
tempered by anxiety over (presumably temporary) high rates of inflation that were being
observed in Poland and in disintegrating Yugoslavia the late 1980s, and by the
knowledge that transition would not happen overnight.
Strategies for Transition
The policymakers in the former Soviet bloc formulated transition strategies that
focused on macroeconomic stabilization and microeconomic restructuring, along with
institutional and political reforms. The implementation of these strategies varied across
countries in speed and specifics. A major debate took place about the merits of fast or
“big bang” reform vs. gradual reform. But as it turned out, almost all the transition
governments plunged ahead in rapid “big bang” style with what I will call Type I
reforms. However, significant policy differences ensued in what I shall term Type II
reforms, which only some governments carried out.
2
Type I reforms typically focused on macro stabilization, price liberalization and
dismantling of the institutions of the communist system. The macroeconomic strategy
emphasized restrictive fiscal and monetary policies, wage controls, and in most cases also
a fixed exchange rate. The micro strategy was to move quickly towards price
liberalization, although a number of key prices like those of energy, housing and basic
consumption goods often remained controlled along with wages and exchange rates. The
institution governing the Soviet bloc trading area, the Council for Mutual EconomicWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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Assistance (CMEA), was abolished and most countries opened up rapidly to international
trade, thus inducing a more efficient allocation of resources based on world market
prices. Most countries also quickly reduced direct subsidies to trusts and state-owned
enterprises, and allowed them to restructure or even break up. They removed barriers to
the creation of new firms and banks and carried out small-scale privatizations. Moreover,
early on most governments broke up the “monobank” system, whereby a single state
bank (or a system of tightly knit but nominally independent banks) functioned as a
country’s central bank as well as a nationwide commercial and investment bank, and
allowed the creation of new and independent banks. A final feature was the introduction
of some elements of a social safety net. These changes caused a sizable reallocation of
labor away from the state-run firms, some of which went to the new private firms and
some of which ended up in nonemployment. The Type I reforms proved relatively
sustainable and were associated with improving economic performance in central Europe
(except the Czech Republic) and in the Baltic countries, whereas they were much less
successful in Russia, the other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States,
and the  Balkans.
Type II reforms involved the development and enforcement of laws, regulations
and institutions that would ensure a successful market-oriented economy. These reforms
include: the privatization of large and medium-sized enterprises; establishment and
enforcement of a market-oriented legal system and accompanying institutions; further in-
depth development of a viable commercial banking sector and the appropriate regulatory
                                                                                                                                                             
2 The “big bang” vs. gradualism debate is also relevant in comparing the former Soviet bloc to China.
China proceeded gradually even with respect to Type I reforms and it also avoided the initial recession
experienced by all transition economies.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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infrastructure; labor market regulations; and institutions related to public unemployment
and retirement systems.
The differences in the ability of transition governments to carry out Type I and
Type II reforms seemed to turn on two factors: their ability to collect taxes with which to
finance public programs and their ability to minimize corruption and rent-seeking
behavior. Type I reforms generally seek to cut off subsidies and to reduce centrally
planned regulation. Since many transition governments had great difficulty in setting up a
reliable tax system, cutting off subsidies and reducing the scope of government was
almost forced upon them. However, Type II reforms emphasize that transition requires
not only the withering away of an omnipresent dictatorial state, but also a creation of a
reliable state apparatus that provides a level playing field for the market economy. Type
II reforms require that government have some resources, at least enough to enforce
market-friendly laws and to avoid being dominated or captured by special interests.  
While the full range of differences across countries in Type II reforms are
difficult to capture, it is possible to give some sense of the differences across several
areas: privatization, banking reform, labor and social institutions, and a market-oriented
legal system.
Remarkable differences exist across the transition economies in the strategy of
privatizing large and medium-sized firms. Poland and Slovenia moved slowly in
privatizing state-owned enterprises, relying instead on “commercialization,” where firms
remained state-owned but were run by somewhat independent appointed supervisory
boards rather than directly by the state, and on the creation of new private firms. Estonia
and Hungary proceeded assiduously and surprisingly effectively with privatization ofWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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individual state-owned enterprises by selling them one-by-one to outside owners. This
method of privatization was originally viewed by many strategists as being too slow. Yet
it provided much-needed managerial skills and external funds for investment in the
privatized firms, it generated government revenue and effective corporate governance,
and it turned out to be relatively fast when carried out by determined governments.
Russia and Ukraine opted for rapid mass privatization and relied primarily on subsidized
management-employee buyouts of firms. This method had the advantage of speed, but it
has led to poor corporate governance in that existing management usually was not able or
willing to improve efficiency. The method also did not generate new investment funds
and skills, and it provided little revenue for the government. Finally, the Czech Republic,
Lithuania and to a lesser extent Slovakia carried out equal-access voucher privatization,
whereby a majority of shares of most firms were distributed to citizens at large. While
this approach may have been most fair and one of the best in terms of speed, it did not
generate new investment funds, nor did it bring revenue to the government. Instead, it
resulted in dispersed ownership of shares and, together with a weak legal framework, it
resulted in poor corporate governance. The poor corporate governance often permitted
managers or majority shareholders to appropriate profit or even assets of the firms
(“tunnel”) at the expense of minority shareholders.
In the development of a banking system, virtually all countries rapidly abolished
the monobank system as part of Type I reforms. Some countries, such as Russia, allowed
spontaneous growth of new banks from the bottom up, resulting in the creation of
hundreds of banks virtually overnight. In central and eastern Europe, the process was
much more government-controlled, but even there dozens of small banks rapidly emergedWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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in countries like Czech Republic and Poland. While the banking systems differed in
various ways, they shared some discouraging patterns. Many of the small banks quickly
collapsed. In most countries, large banks started the transition with a sizable portfolio of
non-performing enterprise loans and, upon restructuring, they rapidly accumulated new
non-performing loans. The large banks survived primarily because they were "too large
to fail" and governments bailed them out.  The need for repeated bailouts of banks has in
the late 1990s led Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland to privatize virtually all domestic
banks to large western banks. Central Europe has thus become a laboratory for observing
several attempts to introduce competitive western banking system with virtually no local
banks.
The transition countries differed in the nature and speed of the development of
labor and social regulations and institutions. By the end of 1991, all the central and east
European countries developed relatively well-functioning unemployment compensation
and social security benefit schemes, with the originally generous benefits becoming
somewhat more modest over time (Ham, Svejnar and Terrell, 1998). In Russia and the
other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the official benefits were
low to start with and decreased dramatically in real terms over time -- and even the low
official benefits were often not paid.
Virtually no transition country succeeded in rapidly developing a legal system and
institutions that would be highly conducive to the preservation of private property and to
the functioning of a market economy, although some countries did much better than
others. This lack of a market-oriented legal structure appears to have been the Achilles
heel of the first dozen years of transition. Many policymakers underestimated theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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importance of a well-functioning legal system or believed too readily that free markets
would take care of any major problems. In addition, many newly rich individuals and
groups in the transition economies -- especially those who have contributed to the
corruption of public officials -- did not desire a strong legal system. The countries that
have made the greatest progress in limiting corruption and establishing a functioning
legal framework and institutions are the central European and Baltic countries, with the
partial exception of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In recent years, an important
impetus for carrying out legal and institutional reforms in many of these countries has
been the need to develop a system that conforms to that of the European Union as a
prerequisite for accession to the EU.
Performance of the Transition Economies Since 1989
The transition economies have not performed as well as many had expected.
Economic performance has also varied widely across the transition countries, with the
central European countries of Poland, Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech
Republic generally performing better than the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania and the Balkan state of Bulgaria and Romania, which in turn performed better
than Russia, Ukraine, and other countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Gross Domestic Product
Calculating the evolution of GDP is difficult in the transition economies. Instead
of GDP, the communist countries used "gross material product" to measure the size ofWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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their economies, a measure which ignored the production of services. Moreover, the
communist economies were characterized by prices that did not reflect scarcity and
consumer demand, thus making market valuations difficult. The dramatic growth in the
number of small firms during the transition was not well-captured in the official statistics
– to say nothing of the course of the underground economy in these countries both before
and during the transition. National statistical offices and the international institutions
have devoted significant resources to estimating GDP for the late 1980s, and tracing out
GDP accurately thereafter, but the early data obviously have to be interpreted with
caution (Filer and Hanousek, 2000, this issue; Brada, King and Kutan, 2000).
With the above caveats in mind, one may interpret the growth performance since
1989 as having been mildly to significantly disappointing in central Europe, and poor to
disastrous in eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Figure 1
provides GDP data for an illustrative set of countries. All of the transition economies
experienced large declines in output at the start of the transition. The decline varied from
13 to 25 percent in central European and eastern Europe; over 40 percent in the Baltic
countries; and as much as 45 percent or more in Russia and even more in many of the
other nations of the CIS, like the drop of almost 65 percent in Ukraine. While the central
and east European countries reversed the decline after 3-4 years, in Russia and most of
the CIS no turnaround was visible through most of the 1990s. Russia, for instance,
suffered a continuous decline in GDP until 1996, showed signs of growth in 1997, but
then went into another 5 percent decline during its 1998 financial crisis.
All central European countries except for the Czech Republic have generated
sustained economic growth since the early to mid-1990s. However, only in Poland hasWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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the rate of growth been sufficient to start closing the relative income gap with the
advanced OECD economies back towards its initial 1989 level. By 2001, every transition
economy had an even larger relative income gap with the advanced economies than had
existed in 1989.
What is the magnitude of the income gap? At 1999 exchange rates, GDP per
capita ranged from $620 in Ukraine to $1,250 in Russia, $4,070 in Poland, $5,200 in the
Czech Republic, and $10,000 in Slovenia (EBRD, 2000). Comparable figures for the
United States, the 15 European Union countries and Japan were $33,900, $22,560 and
$32,600, respectively. The gap between the poor and rich countries is of course reduced
when calculated in terms of purchasing power parity, but nonetheless, for most transition
economies the enormous absolute and relative income gaps will take decades to close.
Note that since these figures refer to almost one decade after price liberalization, they do
not suffer from mis-measurement of inflation, as may have been the case in the early
transition.
The depth and length of the early transition depression was unexpected. A number
of explanations have been offered: tight macroeconomic policies (Bhaduri et al., 1993;
Rosati, 1994); a credit crunch stemming from the reduction of state subsidies to firms and
rise in real interest rates (Calvo and Coricelli, 1992); disorganization among suppliers,
producers and consumers associated with the collapse of central planning (Blanchard and
Kremer, 1997; Roland and Verdier, 1999); a switch from a controlled to uncontrolled
monopolistic structure in these economies (Li, 1999; Blanchard, 1997); difficulties of
sectoral shifts in the presence of labor market imperfections (Atkeson and Kehoe, 1996);
and the dissolution in 1990 of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA),William Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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which governed trade relations across the Soviet-bloc nations.  While each explanation
contains a grain of truth, none is in itself completely convincing. All countries have gone
through the decline, yet cross-country differences in initial conditions and the nature of
reform are substantial enough to make one question the universal applicability of any
single explanation. No explanation has strong empirical support across the board.
What factors account for the persistent growth in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and
Slovenia since the early to mid-1990s, as compared to the recession experienced in the
second half of the 1990s by the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania, and the
continuous decline in Russia and the other CIS countries? Again, no single explanation
suffices. Geography alone does not explain the outcomes as the western-most country,
Czech Republic, did much worse in the second half of the 1990s than countries further
east such as Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. In fact, the evolution of Czech GDP in the
second half of the 1990s resembles that of Bulgaria and Romania.
The extent to which countries pursued a combination of key Type II reforms
provides some explanatory power. The four leading transition economies shown in Figure
1 -- Poland, Slovenia, Hungary, and Slovakia -- have pursued a relatively complete set of
reforms, including maintaining relatively clear property rights and corporate governance.
For example, Hungary and to a lesser extent Slovakia privatized most state-owned
enterprises in a way that assigned clear property rights to the new owners. Poland and
Slovenia proceeded slower with privatization, but both countries exposed the state-owned
enterprises to competition and a risk of financial failure. In all four economies there was
also substantial creation of new private firms that contributed to growth.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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Other countries have carried out much more limited Type II reforms. The Czech
Republic is notable because it was similar to the four leading economies but it grossly
neglected the need to establish a functioning legal framework and corporate governance
of firms and banks. The privatization experience of the Czech Republic, Russia and
Ukraine also suggests that mass privatization in the absence of a functioning legal system
has strong negative effects on performance. The situation in Russia and other CIS
economies has been further aggravated by the political and economic disintegration of the
Soviet Union, including attempted coups, a greater presence of organized crime, and the
spread of aggressive rent seeking and corruption.
Inflation
A number of the transition economies experienced high or hyperinflation as the
communist system disintegrated. Poland, Slovenia, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania all
experienced at least one year from 1990 to 1993 when consumer price inflation exceeded
200 percent; Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania all had one year with inflation around 1000
percent; and Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan experienced at least one year when
inflation was above 2000 percent. Sometimes these bouts of inflation arose after lifting
price controls; in other cases, the inflation grew out of financial sector crises. However,
by the later part of the 1990s, Type I reforms had shown that they could reduce inflation
rates with speed and effectiveness.
The first column of Table 1 shows rates of inflation for a selected group of
transition countries. The first group of countries are in central Europe; the second set
represent the southern part of eastern Europe (Balkan countries); the third set representWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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the northern part of eastern Europe (Baltic countries), the fourth set represent Russia and
other countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States; and the final panel offers
some comparisons from the western European economies and the United States. By 2001,
inflation rates in many transition economies were in single digits. Even countries that
experienced very high rates of inflation during the 1990s -- Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan,
and Bulgaria, for example -- had inflation rates in the range of 9 to 35 percent by 2001.
This outcome is important because annual inflation of 40 percent or less does not seem to
have a major negative impact on economic growth and consumer welfare (Bruno and
Easterly 1995, Fischer, Sahay and Vegh, 1996).
Exchange Rates and Current Account
Most transition economies devalued their currency as a means of export
promotion and adopted a fixed exchange rate as part of macroeconomic stabilization.
They also significantly reoriented their foreign trade away from the old CMEA
arrangements and toward market economies. However, as domestic inflation exceeded
world inflation in the 1990s, the fixed exchange rates often became overvalued, leading
in some cases to substantial current account deficits. For instance, Russia, Albania,
Kazakhstan, and Bulgaria all had at least one year between 1990 and 1993 when the
current account deficit was -10 percent or greater. Most countries responded by devaluing
their currencies again and adopting more flexible exchange rate regimes, although
Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania have fixed their exchange rate through currency boards
as a means of long-term economic stabilization.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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The second column of Table 1 shows that central and eastern Europe now have
current account deficits of moderate size, which would be expected for countries that are
seeking to attract a net inflow of foreign investment capital. However, Russia and the
other economies of the Commonwealth of Independent States are often significant
exporters of natural resources and are experiencing a net outflow of investment funds, as
shown by their current account surpluses.
External Debt and Financial Crises
A number of transition countries started the 1990s with high foreign indebtedness.
In Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland, external debt exceeded 50 percent of GDP in 1990. In
Russia, external debt in 1990 was a whopping 148 percent of GDP. Other transition
economies, such as Romania, Slovenia, Czech Republic, and Slovakia, had conservative
regimes where foreign debt was less than 20 percent of GDP in 1990.
These different initial conditions greatly affected the subsequent performance of
these countries. For instance, high-debt Poland succeeded in renegotiating its debt, while
high-debt Hungary serviced its debt in full. The Hungarian approach imposed a heavy
fiscal burden and induced a number of policies, including the revenue-oriented form of
large-scale privatization.
By the mid-1990s, most of the highly indebted countries reduced their debt
relative to GDP, while a number of the less indebted countries raised theirs. But since
about 1996, foreign indebtedness appears to have risen in the relatively more indebted
countries, especially Hungary and Russia. Indeed, Russia defaulted on its sovereign debt
in 1998. Interestingly, while the Russian financial crisis had a major impact on the CISWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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countries that still have close trading relations with Russia, it had relatively little impact
on the countries of central and eastern Europe or on the Baltic nations, which had already
reoriented most of their trade and commercial relations to western Europe.
The third column of Table 1 shows external debt as a share of GDP in 2000. All
the countries in the table have external debt in excess of 25 percent of GDP, but leaving
aside Bulgaria, none have external debt higher than 70 percent of GDP. This is in line
with a number of other developing and some developed countries. Unless accompanied
by other destabilizing factors, such as a high proportion of short-term debt that may
suddenly not be refinanced as investor sentiment shifts (as was the case in Russia), this
level of debt is not especially alarming.
Budget and Taxes
Since under communism the government owned almost everything, taxes and
expenditures were transfers among centrally determined activities. The principal taxes
were a tax on turnover (inputs plus output), along with other taxes on enterprises and
payroll taxes. Tax rates changed often; indeed in some countries, tax liabilities seemed
more a matter of negotiation than a requirement (Tanzi and Tsibournes, 2000). Since
most taxes were collected at the enterprise level, many citizens were unaware of the
heavy tax burden in the communist economies and thus have resented the explicit taxes
that have been introduced during the transition.
As the transition unfolded, governments had to develop new fiscal institutions for
collecting taxes. This institutional development was one of the hardest Type II reforms to
achieve. While tax collection has been relatively effective in central and eastern Europe,William Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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Russia and some other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States have faced
significant declines in tax revenue as many producers have been operating through barter
and accumulating tax arrears. At the same time, the governments have been facing
numerous public expenditures, including infrastructure and the new social safety net. The
relative inability of Russia and the CIS nations to collect taxes is one reason why their
social safety nets have been much weaker than those in central and eastern Europe.
Many the transition economies, especially those in central and eastern Europe,
have higher tax rates than other countries at a similar level of GDP per capita. The
highest tax burdens -- 35 to 42 percent of GDP -- are found in central Europe among the
most advanced economic reformers, who rely primarily on the payroll tax, value-added
tax and personal income tax to finance government programs (Tanzi and Tsiboures,
2000). The relatively high ratios of taxes to GDP in transition economies have not
prevented governments of many of these countries from running budget deficits. Thus,
Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Russia, Slovakia,
and Ukraine have in a number of years had annual budget deficits in excess of 5 percent
of GDP. The fourth column of Table 1 shows government budget balance as a share of
GDP in 2001.
The patterns in public revenues and expenditures reflect local factors as well as
the mixed advice that the transition economies received from western countries and
institutions. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have generally
advised the transition economies to aim for balanced government budgets, or to run only
small budget deficits, while increasing the size of the private sector and reducing the role
of the government. The European Union also placed emphasis on low budget deficits andWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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imposed a 3 percent upper bound on the size of the deficit relative to GDP as a
precondition for entry into the Union. However, the European Union also requires that
countries applying for EU membership adopt a number of relatively costly social
programs and structural measures, which places upward pressure on government
expenditures.
An especially problematic aspect of the public finances in many transition
economies is the increasing strain from the pension system. The countries of central and
eastern Europe entered the transition with publicly-funded pension systems, almost
universal coverage of the population, low retirement ages (on average 60 for men and 55
for women), a high and growing ratio of retirees to workers, high payroll tax contribution
levels, and high levels of promised benefits relative to recently earned pre-retirement
wages (World Bank, 1994; Svejnar, 1997). Moreover, most of these systems practice a
perverse redistribution of benefits from lower-income workers to higher-income workers.
The promises of these systems, which are largely pay-as-you-go, are not sustainable.
Several countries, including Hungary, Poland, Latvia and Kazakhstan, have already
moved to raise the retirement age and to supplement the public retirement system by a
multi-pillar public/private retirement system with a funded component. Russia and other
CIS countries face less of a public sector burden with regard to retirement costs, because
the level of government-promised retirement benefits is lower.
Given the fiscal pressure under which most of the transition economies operate, it
is interesting to note that their governments have collected very little revenue from
privatization (Tanzi and Tsiboures, 2000). The average in central and eastern Europe, as
well as in the former Soviet Union, was only about 5 percent of GDP. Hungary, whichWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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was most revenue-oriented in its privatization, generated a total of about 14 percent of
GDP, which is still a very modest figure when spread over several years.
Privatization and Creation of New Firms
In the early 1990s, most transition economies rapidly privatized small enterprises
as part of their Type I reforms. This small-scale privatization was done mostly through
local auctions. It was instrumental in creating small and medium-sized enterprises in
countries where most firms were, by ideological and practical design, either large or very
large. Casual evidence suggests that this shift in ownership increased efficiency and
quality of production.
Parallel developments were the breakups of state-owned enterprises (which
contributed to the growth in the number of firms), restructuring of firms and
management, and increased competition. Breakups of small, average and somewhat
above-average size appear to have increased efficiency of both the remaining master
enterprises and the spun-off units (Lizal, Singer and Svejnar, 2001). Some of the broken-
up firms were then privatized.
A large number of new (mostly small) firms were founded. These firms filled
niches in demand and started to compete with existing state-owned enterprises and with
imports. The growth of new firms has varied across countries. In general, it proceeded
faster and smoother in central Europe than in eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of
Independent States. Gomulka (1994) and others attribute much of the success of the
Polish economy to the rising production in the new firms.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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Finally, in most countries, the majority of private assets were generated through
large-scale privatization, which differed in its method across countries. What is
remarkable, however, is how quickly most countries generated private ownership,
irrespective of the particular privatization methods used. In 1990, the private sector had
perhaps 20-25 percent of GDP in Hungary and Poland, but typically only 5-10 percent of
GDP in other transition economies. But these figures increased very quickly. As early as
1994, the private sector was more than 30 percent of GDP in all of the transition
economies and represented half or more of GDP in many countries, including Russia.
The fifth column of Table 1 shows that by 2000 the private sector share of GDP was at or
above 60 percent in all of the transition economies except Slovenia and in most of them it
constituted 70-80 percent.
  The effect of privatization on economic performance is surprisingly hard to
determine. At the country level, some of the fastest growing economies (Poland,
Slovenia, and also China) have been among the slowest to privatize. In a cross-country
econometric study, Sachs, Zinnes and Eilat (2000) find that privatization does not by
itself increase GDP growth, but they find a positive effect when privatization is
accompanied by in-depth institutional reforms. Four recent surveys make assessments
that range from finding no systematically significant effect of privatization on
performance (Bevan, Estrin and Schaffer, 1999), to concluding cautiously that
privatization improves firm performance (Megginson and Netter, 2001), to being fairly
confident that privatization tends to improve performance (Shirley and Walsh, 2000;
Djankov and Murrell, 2000). Clearly, the results are not yet conclusive. Many of the
microeconometric studies suffer from serious problems: small and unrepresentativeWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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samples of firms; misreported or mismeasured data; limited controls for other major
shocks that occurred at the same time as privatization; a short period of observations after
privatization; and above all, not controlling adequately for selectivity bias. Selectivity
bias is likely to be a particularly serious problem since better performing firms tend to be
privatized first (Gupta, Ham and Svejnar, 2001). Thus, comparing the post-privatization
performance of privatized firms to the performance of the remaining state-owned firms
without controlling for selectivity bias, as many studies do, will erroneously attribute the
superior performance of the privatized firms to privatization.
Domestic and Foreign Investment
The communist countries, like the east Asian tigers, were known for high rates of
investment, often exceeding 30 percent of GDP. The investment rates slowed down to
about 30 percent in the 1980s in a number of countries as governments yielded to public
pressure for more consumer goods. The investment rates declined further to about 20
percent of GDP in the 1990s in a number of transition economies (EBRD, 1996),
although countries such as the Czech and Slovak Republics maintained relatively high
levels of investment. Unfortunately, much of this investment appears to have been
allocated inefficiently -- by the monobank system through the 1980s and by the
inexperienced and often politicized or corrupt commercial banks in the 1990s (Lizal and
Svejnar, 2002). Indeed, trends in foreign direct investment may provide a better measure
of the attractiveness of investment in the transition economies than domestic investment
figures.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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As Figure 2 shows, until 1997 Hungary was the only transition economy
receiving a significant flow of foreign direct investment. Analysts usually attribute this
success to the fact that Hungary was more hospitable to and had well-defined rules and
regulations for foreign direct investment since the early 1980s. But starting in 1998,
major foreign investments went to the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. However,
many countries of eastern Europe remain, along with Russia, rather unattractive to
foreign direct investment.  The rate of foreign direct investment appears to increase with
several factors: the proximity of the perceived date of accession of a given country to the
European Union; the desirability of the country's political, economic and legal
environment; and the availability of attractive privatization projects in the country.
Employment Adjustment, Wage Setting and Unemployment
State-owned enterprises in all the transition economies rapidly decreased
employment and/or real wages in the early 1990s (Svejnar, 1999). In central Europe, the
greatest initial reduction in industrial employment occurred in Hungary (over 20 percent),
followed by Slovakia (over 13 percent), Poland (over 10 percent), and the Czech
Republic (9 percent). The downward adjustment in industrial wages proceeded in reverse
order and amounted to 24 percent in the Czech Republic, 21 percent in Slovakia and 1
percent in Poland. Hungarian real wages in industry actually rose by 17 percent (Basu,
Estrin and Svejnar, 2000). In Russia and the rest of CIS, the adjustment brought a mixture
of wage and employment adjustment (Desai and Idson, 2000) and the wage decline was
more pronounced than in central and eastern Europe (Boeri and Terrell, this issue). As
Basu, Estrin and Svejnar (1997, 2000) show, labor demand elasticities with respect toWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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output and wages were significant in the more marketized pre-transition economies, and
they rose rapidly in central Europe as transition was launched.  Depending on the
institutional setting in a given country, the sharp decline in output at the start of the
transition was hence absorbed more by employment or wage decreases.
Figure 3 shows that in most transition economies, the employment decline
reached 15-30 percent in the 1990s. A continuous decline is observed in Russia, Slovakia
and Romania; an L-shape pattern detected in Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovenia; a U-shape
pattern in Poland; and a sideways S-shape pattern in the Czech Republic. When
combined with the GDP data in Figure 1, the employment data suggest that restructuring
in the transition economies involved an initial decline in labor productivity as output fell
faster than employment and a subsequent rise in productivity as output and labor stopped
declining. But a note of caution is in order here. With production shifting from large to
small firms, the decline in employment (and output) may be less pronounced than
suggested by the official data, since small firms are harder to capture in official statistics.
Unemployment was unknown before the transition, but it emerged rapidly in
central and east European countries, except for the Czech Republic. Within two years
after the start of the transition, the unemployment rate rose into double digits in most
economies of central and eastern Europe. By 1993, for example, the unemployment rate
reached 16 percent in Bulgaria and Poland, 12 percent in Hungary and Slovakia, 10
percent in Romania, 9 percent in Slovenia, but only 3.5 percent in the Czech Republic.
The high unemployment rates reflected high rates of inflow into unemployment as firms
laid off workers, and relatively low outflow rates as the unemployed found it hard to find
new jobs. The Czech labor market was an ideal model of a transition labor market,William Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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characterized by high inflows as well as outflows, with unemployment representing a
transitory state between old and new jobs (Ham, Svejnar and Terrell, 1998, 1999, Svejnar
1999, and Boeri, 2000). Unemployment rose more slowly in the Commonwealth of
Independent States and the Baltic countries, as firms were slower to lay off workers and
used wage declines and arrears as devices to hold on to workers. In 1993, for example,
unemployment in Russia and Estonia still hovered near 6 percent.
Over time, the patterns of unemployment have shown considerable
differentiation. The Czech Republic was the only central European country to enter
recession in the second half of the 1990s and its unemployment rate correspondingly rose
to 8 percent. The fast-growing economies of Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, and to a lesser
extent Slovakia managed to reduce their unemployment rates in the late 1990s.
Conversely, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Baltic countries
experienced gradual increases in unemployment as their transition proceeded. By 1997,
unemployment rates in Russia and Estonia were near 10 percent. By 1999-2000, the
unemployment rate rose again in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and
Slovenia. It stabilized in countries such as Hungary, Romania and Russia. As may be
seen in column 6 of Table 1, with the exception of Hungary, Slovenia and Romania,
transition economies in 2000 had relatively high unemployment rates that are at least as
high, and often significantly exceed, those observed in the European Union.
While real wages in central and eastern Europe have increased by about 15-20
percent after their initial 25 percent decline in the 1989-91 period, in Russia and a
number of other CIS countries real wages declined until 1993 and stagnated or increasedWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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only moderately thereafter (Svejnar, 1999; EBRD, 2000). The trajectory of real incomes
has thus been very different in the more and less advanced transition economies.
The reduction in employment in the old state-owned firms, rise in unemployment
and establishment of new firms have brought about considerable destruction and creation
of jobs, as well as mobility of labor. Contrary to the main models of the transition
process, Jurajda and Terrell (2001) show that job creation in new firms is not necessarily
tightly linked to job destruction in the old firms since many new jobs have been created
even in economies (such as the Czech Republic) that experienced low rates of job
destruction. Sabirianova (2000) provides a related structural insight, namely that much of
the labor mobility consisted of occupational rather than geographic change, with
individuals moving from one occupation to another within regions, as jobs in old
occupations were destroyed and opportunities in new occupations were created.
Compared to the U.S. labor market, where individuals move more geographically than
occupationally, the transition has led to more occupational rather than geographic
mobility.
Data on income distribution, expressed in the form of Gini coefficients, are
summarized in Table 2.
3 The communist countries had highly egalitarian income
distributions. In central and east Europe, the Gini coefficients ranged from 20 in
Czechoslovakia and Slovenia to 25 in Poland in the late 1980s. The 1988 Ukrainian Gini
coefficient of 23 (based on survey data) and the 1991 Russian coefficient of 26 based on
the registry wage data of the Russian Statistical Office (Goskomstat) suggest that income
distribution was relatively egalitarian in the former Soviet Union as well. However,William Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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inequality increased during the 1990s, with the Gini coefficient reaching 26-34 in central
and east Europe, 30 in Ukraine and 40 in Russia. These coefficients bring inequality in
the transition economies into the range spanned by capitalist economies from the
relatively egalitarian Sweden to the relatively inegalitarian United States, and in line with
developing countries such as India. However, while the central and east European data
seem to reflect reality, the Russian and Ukrainian data may well understate the extent of
inequality. In particular, the Goskomstat data are based on wages that firms are supposed
to be paying to workers, but  many Russian firms have not been paying contractual wages
(Desai and Idson, 2000). In Table 2, a second row for Russia and Ukraine shows
inequality based on survey data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring of households.
These data suggest that income inequality in Russia and Ukraine has reached much
higher levels – a Gini coefficient of 47-50 – which resembles the level of inequality
found in developing economies with the most inegalitarian distribution of income, like
Brazil. The relatively egalitarian structure of income distribution in central and eastern
European countries has been brought about by their social safety nets, which rolled back
inequality that would have been brought about by market forces alone (Garner and
Terrell, 1998). Conversely, the Russian social safety net has been regressive -- it has
made the distribution of income more unequal than it would have been without it
(Commander, Tolstopiatenko and Yemtsov, 1999).
Life Expectancy
                                                                                                                                                             
3 The Gini coefficient varies from 0 to 100, with 0 representing a perfectly egalitarian distribution of
income (every individual or household receiving the same income) and 100 denoting the most inegalitarian
distribution (one person or household receiving all income).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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A number of social indicators suggest that average living standards improved
during the transition in central Europe, improved slightly in the Baltic countries,
remained about the same or declined slightly in the Balkan countries not involved in
wars, and declined in the CIS. The data on life expectancy presented in Table 3 show this
pattern. For comparison, between 1989 and 1999, life expectancy at birth increased by
about two years from 75 to 76.9 years in the United States and from 76.5 to 78.5 years in
France. During the same period, life expectancy increased by one to three years in most
central European countries; increased slightly in the Baltic countries; declined slightly in
Albania, Bulgaria and Romania; and declined by 2.5 years in Russia, over three years in
Ukraine and almost four years in Kazakhstan. The decline in life expectancy in Russia,
Ukraine and Kazakhstan during the transition hence represents a major break from
increasing life expectancies in the past. Disaggregated data indicate that the decline in life
expectancy in the CIS countries is largely due to the early deaths of middle aged males,
who are presumably more exposed to stress and resort to heavy alcohol consumption.
Fertility
Fertility data in Table 3 indicate that the number of births per woman declined
dramatically in virtually all the transition economies in the 1990s, as compared to the
counterpart numbers in western countries and to the trend in the 1980s. As of 1989, the
transition and western countries had similar ranges of fertility rates, from 1.5 in Slovenia
to 2.2 in Romania among the transition countries, and from 1.4 in Germany to 2.0 in the
United States. In the 1990s, fertility rates decline modestly in western Europe and rise
slightly in the United States. In contrast, in Russia and Ukraine the fertility ratesWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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plummeted from about 2 to 1.3. The rate of decline is substantial in all the other transition
economies.
Marriage and Divorce Rates
As may be seen from Table 4, marriage rates have been declining over time in
most western as well as transition economies. Moreover, marriage rates in continental
European countries have traditionally been lower than in the United Kingdom and United
States. But the rate of decline in marriage rates accelerated in most transition economies.
In 1989, marriage rates in the Soviet republics and the Czech part of Czechoslovakia
were in a range of 8 to 10 percent. By 2000, these transition economies recorded
marriage rates of 3.3 to 6 percent.
Conversely, the data in Table 4 indicate that the propensity to divorce does not
seem to have been much affected by the transition. Indeed, while divorce rates rise in
western European countries in the 1990s, they declined in many transition economies,
including Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine.
Hence, while one might expect that the psychological stress and economic
hardship of the transition would result in increased breakups of families, on the whole
this has not been the case. The transition appears to have had a strong negative effect on
marriage formation and fertility, but it has not destroyed existing marriages.
Attitudes
People’s attitudes toward the transition provide interesting information that
complements the evidence on behavior. Table 5 presents several key findings from aWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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1999 study carried out by Public Opinion Research Center (1999) on national random
samples of 1,018 individuals in the Czech Republic, 1,523 individuals in Hungary and
1,111 individuals in Poland. These three countries are the most advanced transition
economies. They have succeeded in joining OECD and NATO, and are among the five
front-runners for admission to the European Union. However, the findings reflect quite
negative attitudes toward the benefits of the transition during the 1989-99 decade.
In all three countries the majority of individuals feel that it was worthwhile to
change the political and economic system, with the largest majority (67 percent) being
found in Poland where the political revolts in the 1980s were the strongest and the GDP
growth in the 1990s the fastest. However, in each country many more people believed
that the losses from transition exceeded the gains than the reverse. Similarly, in each
country more respondents feel that their “material conditions of living are now a little
worse” than the reverse. The attitudinal survey hence provides a sobering assessment of
how people in the most advanced transition economies feel about the benefits and costs
of the transition. It is likely that the sentiment in the more poorly performing countries is
even more pessimistic.
Assessment
The performance of the former Soviet bloc economies during the first twelve
years of the transition has been poor.  While many important structural transformations
have taken place, the relative gap in per capita income between these countries and the
advanced economies has widened. A major problem for the transition economies wasWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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clearly the initial recession that set them back relative to the advanced economies. In
Russia, Ukraine and other CIS countries, this depression lasted almost a decade.
Transition countries further east have on average performed worse than their more
western counterparts, which suggests that geography-related initial conditions have been
important in the transition process. The central European countries, located most to the
west among the transition economies, have historically shared the same alphabet and
religions, had similar educational and bureaucratic systems, and intensively traded and
otherwise interacted with countries in western Europe. They, together with the Balkan
countries, were under the Soviet system for only four decades, as compared to five
decades in the case of the Baltic countries and seven decades in the countries of the
Commonwealth of Independent States. Finally, the countries of central Europe were the
first to aspire and be encouraged to prepare for entry to the European Union. The physical
proximity and historical belongingness to Europe hence seems to have provided an
important advantage for the “western” transition economies in moving from the Soviet-
style system to a democratic and market-oriented system. However, the fact that the
western-most transition economy, Czech Republic, has performed worse than others
since the mid 1990s indicates that geography does not provide a complete explanation
and that policies do matter.
4
                                                     
4 An interesting counterfactual approach to assessing the validity of initial conditions versus policies as
explanations is to ask how an aggressive effort by western countries would have affected the transition.
For example, consider East Germany, which received enormous capital inflows from West Germany ($80-
100 billion annually) to build modern infrastructure and by absorption into a united Germany received a
modern legal and institutional infrastructure. However, West Germany also feared a flood of businesses to
low-wage East Germany, and a flood of East Germans coming west for higher wages and welfare benefits.
It thus passed a set of rules that raised labor cost per worker in eastern Germany from about 10 percent of
the western German level to about 80 percent. This dramatic jump in labor cost, combined with relatively
low labor productivity, made firms in eastern Germany retrench and forced many of them out of existence.
Since the early 1990s open and disguised unemployment in eastern Germany has been at about twice the
level of unemployment in the central European transition economies. Any substantial western plan to assistWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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Interestingly, the initial conditions had little impact on whether the countries
carried out Type I reforms -- macroeconomic stabilization, price liberalization, reduction
of direct subsidies, breakup of trusts, state-owned enterprises and the monobank system,
removal of barriers to the creation of new firms, carrying out small-scale privatization,
and introduction of a social safety net -- which all transition economies carried out
quickly. However, they did affect Type II reforms: large-scale privatization, further (in-
depth) development of a commercial banking sector and effective tax system, labor
market regulations and institutions related to the social safety net, and establishment and
enforcement of a market-oriented legal system and accompanying institutions. The
reform of greatest importance seems to be that countries that placed emphasis on the
development of a functioning legal framework and corporate governance of firms, like
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, have performed better than those that did not, like the
Czech Republic, Russia and Ukraine. On a related note, evidence suggests that large-
scale privatization can be handled in a variety of ways, or even delayed, as long as the
state-owned firms face the discipline of needing to earn their way without government
bailouts and as long as new firms appear through new creation, breakups of old firms,
and foreign investment.
When Will the Transition be Over?
                                                                                                                                                             
transition countries would have offered lower subsidies and created less legal and institutional reform than
occurred in East Germany, although the effects of such financial subsidies, institutional reforms and market
access could nonetheless have been substantial.  But such a plan might also have involved restrictions on
labor leaving the transition economies or demands that expensive social programs be enacted. Likely
results would be a faster rise in living standards for the employed, higher unemployment rate and more
unequal income distribution in transition economies. The overall effect on economic growth and other
performance indicators would depend on which effects dominated.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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Since transition is a process, it is natural to ask when it is likely to be completed.
The answer depends on how one defines the terminal point. A number of analysts are on
record on this issue and their definitions differ considerably.
Janos Kornai (1999) views the end of transition as a situation in which the
communist parties have lost monopoly political power, the private sector accounts for the
majority of GDP, and the market is the dominant coordinator of economic activities.
According to this sensible definition, rooted in a radical shift in political power and a
fundamental structural change in the economy, the transition is in most countries over --
and has been so for the last five years.
From a different angle, Alan Gelb (1999) sees the end of transition as a state when
the problems and the policy issues confronted by today's "transition countries" resemble
those faced by other countries at similar levels of development. This definition relies on
notions of economic development and also makes good sense. Based on this definition,
one may also argue that the transition is over. The fact that private sector analysts such as
Morgan Stanley and publications such as The Economist increasingly place advanced
transition countries into the general category of "emerging market economies" also
supports this point of view.
But whatever the logic of these arguments, most citizens of the transition
countries do not feel that they have accomplished the transition. I believe that this is
because most have been implicitly equating the transition with a process that will make
them partners with the relatively advanced countries in the world in general, and with
western Europe in particular. Taking this aspect into account, I would define the end of
transition as a state when these economies replace central planning by a functioningWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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market system and when they generate rapid and sustainable rates of economic growth
that enable them to interact with the more advanced market economies without major
forms of protection. Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, and possibly
Slovakia will presumably reach this stage in a few years when they fully enter the
European Union. Others have a much longer way to go.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 415
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Share of GDP 
Unemployment
(annual percentage 
change)  (as % of GDP ) (as % of GDP ) (as % of GDP ) (in per cent, mid-year) (percent)
2001 2001 2000 2001 2000 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Czech Republic 4.6 -5.1 46.5 -9.2 80 8.9
Hungary 9.4 -5.4 67.8 -3.5 80 6.5
Poland 6.6 -6.0 42.8 -3.0 70 16.1
Slovak Republic 7.1 -3.8 53.5 -4.0 75 18.6
Slovenia 7.7 -3.0 33.4 -1.3 55 7.0
Estonia 6.2 -7.7 63.0 -0.5 75 13.7
Latvia 3.3 -7.1 66.2 -2.0 65 14.3
Lithuania 2.0 -6.4 43.8 -1.4 70 16.1
Albania 4.0 -6.3 29.1 -9.2 75 17.1
Bulgaria 8.0 -5.2 86.0 -1.5 70 16.2
Romania 35.0 -3.9 27.8 -4.0 60 7.2
Kazakhstan 8.7 2.0 67.6 -1.5 60 6.3
Russia 22.4 10.2 62.0 0.0 70 10.0
Ukraine 16.0 1.4 33.2 -3.0 60 4.2
EU 1.8 -0.4 na -0.2 na 8.2
United States 2.6 -4.2 na 1.5 na 4.0
Notes: Data for 2000 are estimates and 2001 are projections 
Sources: (1)-(5) William Davidson Institute based on EBRD Transition Report various issues, IMF World Economic Outlook May 2001, OECD Economic Outlook Vol. 69 July 2001, UN Transition At A Glance 2001, World Bank 
World Development Indicators 2001, and EIU-Datastream. (6) William Davidson Institute based on ILO(2000), World Bank (2001), EBRD various issues, and OECD (2001) based on labor force surveys. Russian data from 
Sabirianova & Earle 2001 using LFS figures, reported in Goskomstat (2000c), Goskomstat (1999a), and OECD (2000).  Kazahkstan value for 1999.  Unless otherwise indicated, the data are generally annual averages of monthly, 
quarterly, or semi-annual data. See the following website for full source information: http://www.wdi.bus.umich.eduTable 2
Income Inequality (Gini Coefficients)
Year Gini Year Gini Year Gini
Czech Republic 1988 20.0 1992 23.0 1996 26.0
Hungary 1987 24.4 1992 26.0 1998 25.3
Poland 1987 25.0 1993 29.8 1998 32.7
Slovak Republic 1988 19.5 1993 21.5 1996 26.3
Slovenia 1987 19.8 1993 24.1 1996 26.1
Estonia 1987-90 0.24 1993-94 0.35 1996-99 0.37
Latvia 1987-90 0.24 1995 0.31 1996-99 0.32
Lithuania 1987-90 0.23 1993-94 0.33 1996-99 0.34
Bulgaria 1989 21.7 1993 33.3 1997 34.1
Romania 1989 23.3 1994 28.6 1997 30.5
Russia
a 1991 26.0 1993 39.8 2000 39.9
Russia
b
1992 54.3 1994 45.5 1996 51.8
Ukraine
a
... na 1996 33.4 1999 30.0
Ukraine
b 1988 23.3 1995 47.0 ... na
Notes: a) based on Goskomstat data; b) based on survey data.
Gini =
Late 1980s Early 1990s Late 1990s
Sources: William Davidson Institute based on various sources and Davidson Institute staff calculations.  See the following website for full source information: 
http://www.wdi.bus.umich.edu.














1980 1989 1999 1980 1989 2000 1980 1989 1999 1980 1989 2000
Czech Republic 70.26 71.66 74.62 7.6 8.6 4.3 2.07 1.87 1.17 2.6 3.0 3.1
Hungary 69.51 69.50 70.62 7.5 6.3 4.6 1.91 1.78 1.32 2.6 2.4 2.6
Poland 70.10 71.04 73.19 8.6 6.8 3.6 2.28 2.08 1.40 1.1 1.2 1.2
Slovak Republic 70.41 71.03 72.70 7.9 7.6 5.0 2.31 2.08 1.37 1.3 1.6 1.6
Slovenia 70.28 72.65 75.06 6.5 4.9 3.7 2.08 1.52 1.24 1.2 1.1 1.1
Estonia 69.08 70.09 70.59 8.8 8.1 3.5 2.02 2.21 1.23 4.1 3.8 3.2
Latvia 69.13 70.13 69.82 9.8 9.0 3.3 2.00 2.05 1.11 5.0 4.2 2.5
Lithuania 70.70 71.49 72.11 9.2 9.4 5.0 1.97 1.98 1.35 3.2 3.3 3.3
Albania 69.33 72.48 72.08 … … … 3.62 3.00 2.40 … … …
Bulgaria 71.36 71.77 71.07 7.9 7.0 4.0 2.05 1.90 1.13 1.5 1.4 1.2
Romania 69.09 69.53 69.47 8.2 7.7 5.9 2.43 2.20 1.32 1.5 1.6 1.9
Kazakhstan 66.62 68.29 64.83 … 10.0 6.0 2.90 2.82 2.00 … 2.8 2.2
Russia 67.11 69.28 65.85 10.6 9.4 5.0 1.88 2.01 1.25 4.2 4.0 3.1
Ukraine 69.19 70.54 67.30 9.3 9.5 6.0 1.99 1.99 1.30 … 3.7 3.5
France 74.25 76.50 78.51 6.2 5.0 4.9 1.95 1.79 1.77 1.5 1.9 2.0
Germany 72.63 ... 76.99 6.3 … 5.4 1.44 1.42 1.35 1.8 2.0 2.4
United Kindgom  73.78 ... 77.25 14.8 14.0 10.6 1.89 1.80 1.71 2.8 2.9 3.2
United States 73.66 75.02 76.91 10.5 9.7 8.5 1.84 2.01 2.06 5.2 4.7 4.6
Sources: William Davidson Institute based on the World Bank World Development Indicators 2001, and the Global Market Information Database.
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From a temporal perspective, do you think that it was 
worthwhile to change the political and economic system? Yes No
The Czech Republic 55% 32%
Hungary 46% 40%
Poland 67% 24%
Have the changes taking place in your country since 1989 
brought people more losses than gains?
More gains than 
losses
The same
More losses than 
gains
Difficult to say
The Czech Republic 23% 42% 31% 4%
Hungary 15% 28% 45% 12%
Poland 24% 30% 37% 8%
Please compare your present situation with the situation 




A little worse Difficult to say
The Czech Republic 20% 37% 20% 23%
Hungary 41% 29% 14% 16%
Poland 30% 44% 14% 12%
The Czech Republic 30% 29% 33% 8%
Hungary 12% 16% 66% 6%
Poland 25% 19% 46% 10%
The Czech Republic 35% 30% 29% 6%
Hungary 18% 27% 49% 6%
Poland 28% 23% 40% 9%






Your life is now generally:
The opportunities of having an impact on the political life in 
the country are now:
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